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Abstract 
 
For thousands of years, humans have known the value of honeybees in agriculture. Their 
pollination services are crucial for the mankind, the Global ecosystem and food production. 
Without the pollination services of honeybees, human population on earth could not be 
what it is today. A serious famine would arise with a detrimental effect on the quality of life. 
The recently documented decline of the honeybee colonies in the world is alarming and 
may threaten the whole living nature. To develop a proper policy intervention, the 
economic analysis can be employed to develop Honeybee Economics. Such an 
endeavour reveals striking efficiencies of honeybee societies in terms of division of labor, 
the pleasure of work instead of shirking, career development, information sharing, and 
extreme altruism. A communist society, however, comes at a cost. Strict policing in 
management of the genetic interest conflicts is unavoidable in terms of workers' 
dictatorship with a rather limited power allocated to the Monarch. In our paper, the 
economy of honeybees is analyzed in terms of an implicit labor contract with a farmer. It is 
a two-output economy:  the honeybees not only produce honey but are engaged in Pareto-
efficient exchange with flowering plants including procurer and provision of pollination 
services. This benefits the whole nature, including the mankind. From the global 
perspective, markets for pollination services exist only in limited areas, for example in the 
Western United States. The missing market makes the pollination an externality. In their 
principal-agent relationship with the farmer, the working effort of honeybees appears a 
virtue in the spirit of the Calvinist Ethics. Therefore, it is appropriate to value their labor 
effort in terms of the Marxian labor theory of value. But it is subject of time inconsistency. 
The industry is subject of substantial risks. The risk aversion creates a wedge between the 
expected market price and the production cost. The risks are reflected in volatility in the 
pollination services reducing the consumers' welfare. Data on honey production, a 
complement to the pollution services, is used to examine the magnitude of risks and the 
potential cycles. Both the externality, the industry risks and the risk aversion speak for 
taxing consumers and subsidizing producers as the solution for the optimal tax problem. 
 
 
JEL Classification: D6, H2, Q57 
 
Keywords: economics of honeybees, pollination, quality of life, ecology policy, optimal tax, 
subsidy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vesa Kanniainen   Tuula Lehtonen 
  
Department of Political and Economic Studies Finnish Beekeepers’ Association  
University of Helsinki   (Suomen Mehiläishoitajain Liitto ry) 
P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7)  Kasarmikatu 26 C 34 
FI-00014 University of Helsinki  00130 Helsinki 
FINLAND    FINLAND 
 
e-mail: vesa.kanniainen@helsinki.fi  e-mail: tuula.lehtonen@hunaja.net 
  
 
Ilkka Mellin 
 
Department of Mathematics and Systems Analysis 
Aalto University 
P.O. Box 11100 (Otakaari 1 M) 
FI-00076 Aalto 
Finland 
 
e-mail: ilkka.mellin@aalto.fi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This paper started as a pleasant joke and raised the question whether a communist 
society can survive on our planet. The honeybee economies indeed are characterized by 
communism. The expedition soon became serious with the news that the pollination 
services of honeybees are dramatically declining globally. This raises an issue of proper 
ecology policy. The authors are indebted to Heikki Helanterä, Klaus Kultti, Roland 
Magnusson, Panu Poutvaara and Heikki Sarmaja for helpful comments on the preliminary 
draft. The paper was presented at the XXXV Annual Meeting of the Finnish Economic 
Association, Mariehamn, February 14-15, 2013. 
1 Introduction
When Joseph Stalin wanted to create a new Soviet man and a happy commu-
nist society he probably should have studied the societies of honeybees. The
life of these fascinating eusocial animals - Apis mellifera - successfully wit-
nesses that a communism may nd e¢cient solutions for social and economic
structures and survive - though augmented with some key democratic mech-
anisms.1 Their major infrastructure, the beehive with fabulously designed
hexagonal cells, constructed and managed with funtionally implemented di-
vision of labor serves as a public good for 10.000-80.000 individuals. When it
gets crowded two thirds of its inhabitants take o¤ with the Queen to search
for their happiness in a new home. It is not less fascinating that though the
honeybee economy is based on communism and collective ownership its gov-
ernance is based on dictatorship of the working class. The decision makers,
workers, are all determinate females. Moreover, there is no party elite. The
monarch, their mother Queen is just another public good of the beehive with
the task of producing up to 150.000 eggs.2 Stalin would not have appreciated
such a political system not to mention its female governance. Neither would
he have appreciated the decision making procedure concerning the two key
decisions of these societies: rst, how to inform the colleague workers of the
location of the owering plants; second, how to nd the new home when the
old one cannot any more accommodate all society members.
To arrive at those decisions, a democratic voting mechanism has been
introduced during the evolution including the e¤orts in collecting, processing
and evaluating information. The information evaluation mechanism is called
the waggle dance.3 What the waggle dance does is to transforms the infor-
mation into a public good.4 Indeed, the waggle dance of honeybees which
developed apparently millions of years ago can be viewed as corresponding
1In human societies, the success of communism with collective ownership appears to
be limited to cooperatives, Wikipedia and the Linux operating system.
2The public good nature of the Queen arises from the fact that she produces o¤spring
to a number of drones after her mating ight. As the number of lucky drones is limited
to 10-20, she represents an impure public good.
3On the waggle dance and for a lovely summary of the life of honeybees, the suggested
reading is Seeley (2010) on which most of the information on honeybees in our article is
based. Other highly fascinating readings include OMalley (2010) and Nordhaus (2010).
4Professor Karl von Frisch from the University of Munich was subsequently awarded
the Nobel Prize for his revolutionary discovery of the waggle dance in 1944.
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to the GPS invented by humans much more recently.5
It is not only that the honeybees communist economy with workers
dictatorship reveals striking e¢ciencies in terms of division of labor and its
allocation to tasks inside and outside the beehive, non-shirking, the pleasure
of work, career development, information sharing, and extreme altruism. Any
economist can appreciate such a system. The success of honeybees is more
than that; it is a blessing for the mankind and the whole living nature through
the pollination services. It is important for the sexual reproduction of many
crops and thereby important for providing calories and micronutrients for
humans.
Unlike cryptogams, a substantial share of plants would not survive with-
out pollination by insects.6 The price of food would by far exceed the current
market price. Most animal populations would also su¤er substantially. The
equilibrium human population and its distribution would be rather di¤er-
ent from what it is today on earth. Therefore, the decline of pollination
species can lead to a parallel decline of plan species, for an extensive survey
see Klein et al (2007) and the references there. For tropical crops, 70 %
seem to have at least one variety for which production is improved by animal
pollination, cf. Roubik (1995). As many as 87 crops, that is 70 percent of
the 124 main crops used directly for human consumption in the world, are
dependent on pollinators (Klein et al. (2007)). It is an ecosystem service
in that wild pollinators, in particular wild bees, contribute signicantly to
the pollination of a large array of crops (Kremen et al. (2002), Morandin
and Winston (2005), Greenleaf and Kremen (2006), Winfree et al. (2007),
(2008)). For the European crops, Williams (1994) assessed the pollinator
needs for 264 crop species concluding that the production of 84 % of these
depends at least to some extent upon animal pollination. In North America,
the managed honeybees are the primary pollinators for some 50 fruit and
vegetable crops which together form the most nutritious portion of our daily
5All bees including the honeybees are descended from one ancestral species of the
vegetarian wasp that lived approximately 100 million years ago. Though nearly all wasps
are predators that kill other insects, bees have abandoned the carnivorous behavior and
depend instead on collecting protein-rich pollen from owers. Both bees and wasps visit
owers. Both feed on sugary nectar for energy, but it is between the pollen-loving bees
and the owering plants that a strong mutual dependence has evolved over the millions of
years (Seeley (2010)).
6The evolution has (apparently) rst produced the cryptogams and the wind pollination
of owering plants and only subsequently the pollination by insects.
2
diet (Seeley (2010)).
Hobeybees are the most economically valuable pollinators of crop mono-
cultures worldwide. The total economic value of pollination worldwide amounted
to e153 billion which represented 9.5 percent of the value of the world agri-
cultural production used for human food in 2005 as calculated by Gallai et
al. (2009). The impact of honeybees on the productivity growth of the al-
falfa seeds in the 1940s and 1950s was documented by Olmstead and Wooten
(1987). While the conversion of land for agriculture is one of the major
causes of diminishing natural ecosystems and biodiversity natural land pre-
serves can also give economic benets to growers by promoting wild bee
populations that enhance seed production and yield (Morandin and Winston
(2006). For a recent study, see Calderone (2012)).7
Dramatically enough, there is by now mounting evidence of pollinator
decline all over the world and the consequences in many agricultural areas
could be signicant, see Gallai, N., Salles, J-M., Settele, J., and Vaissiere,
B.E., (2009). In the latest dacade, a third of the national bee herd - about a
million colonies - has died each year, often under mysterious circumstances in
the USA (Nordhaus (2010)). Data from the US Department of Agriculture is
striking. It shows 32 percent fall in 2007 following 36 percent decline in 2008,
and 29 percent drop in beehives in 2009. Sumner and Boriss (2006) report
of an earlier decline in the USA where the number of colonies has declined
from 3.4 million in 1989 to 2.5 million in 2004.8 The decline a¤ects not only
honey production but around 15 billion dollars worth of crops that depend
on bees for pollination. Scientists call the phenomenon "colony collapse dis-
order" (CCD) that has led to the disappearance of millions of adult bees and
beehives and occurred also elsewhere in the world including Europe.
The reasons for the decline may be many and apparently several factors
are involved like the spread of pests like parasitic mites, the small hive bee-
tle and the microsporidian parasite, improper pesticide and herbicide use,
7For approaches to the economic valuation of pollination services, we also refer to FAO
(2006).
8There is one exception of these ndings and it is based on the estimates of the number
of hives instead of populations. According to Champetier (2010), di¤erent statistics in
the US case appear to tell a di¤erent story. In some of them, the number of hives has
decreased steadily in 1986-2009 while in others there would have been an increase in in
the number of hives in 2002-2007. He, however, points out that variations in the size of
colonies can be large and therefore, colony counts do not necessarily provide an accurate
measure of honey bee abundance.
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not forgetting the aging of the beekeeper population in Europe and North
America, and lower market prices for their products and services (cf. Klein
et al (2007)). One should add in the list the African killer bee which is
spreading in the South and West USA from the Latin America. The more
recent concerns are linked to insecticides. While the researchers have looked
at viruses, parasites, insecticides, malnutrition and other environmental fac-
tors they have been unable to pinpoint a specic cause for the production
decline. The phenomenon may results from a combination of factors but it
has been suggested that the increased use of pesticides might be the major
cause.9
The economy of the honeybees within the nature or under a labor con-
tract with a human farmer results in a remarkable externality. By providing
pollination services, the honeybees facilitate the reproduction of owering
plants on which we human beings are so dependent on. The issue of exter-
nalities has not been left unnoticed in. Cheung (1973) and Johnson (1973)
had discredited the original Meade (1952) and Bator (1958) view of underpro-
vision of both honey and, say, apples as the reciprocal externalities between
beekeepers and apple farmers can be internalized in the market for pollina-
tion services. Indeed, in the US west cost states, beekeepers and growers
of pollination-requiring and nectar-producing crops transact regularly in the
market for pollination services. Subsequently, Muth et al. (2003) provided a
careful study of the US honey price support program in 1987-1995 on Oregon
prices and their interaction with pollination fees. They also provided esti-
mates of the net consumer benets, net producer benets and the taxpayer
expenses. They found in particular that the years with the highest taxpayer
expenses in the early 1980s are associated with the largest net social losses.
Another important question they addressed was the impact of the honey price
program on the pollination services. If the Coasian transaction costs reduce
the e¢ciency of the market for pollination services, honey subsidy induces
more pollination services enhancing the e¢ciency and resulting in welfare
gains. The opposite is the case if the contracting between beekeepers and
crop farmers is e¢cient. Hence, the issue is empirical. Moreover, if honey
and pollination services are complementary outputs, the honey price support
would reduce equilibrium pollination fees as a result of a more extensive sup-
9See http://phys.org/news189058713.html. Recently, a suggestion to prohibit the use
of the pesticides belonging to the neonicotinoids has been discussed in the European
Commission.
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ply in the market for pollination services. In the regression of the service
fee on the honey price, the relationship turned out to be negative providing
support for the view that the price support program indeed induced more
supply in the market for pollination services. Rucker et al. (2003) repro-
duced the estimation by Muth et in 1987-2002 in Oregon and Washington.
In contrast to Muth et al., they obtained a positive and signicant coe¢cient
on the honey price variable. The controversy thus remains.
Well-functioning markets for pollution services appear to exist in parts
of the USA only, not globally. Their importance is apparent in the west cost
and Florida though no studies are available from Florida. For the Californian
farmers, the rental services by the bee keepers of Oregon and Washington are
essential as California is rather dry and does not have su¢ciently honeybees
of its own.10 Interesting enough, Californian almond trees have been polli-
nated also by human labor from Asia. What an ine¢ciency when compared
with the honeybee pollution! Champetier (2010) reported that the polli-
natrion fees increased dramatically in 2003-2009. The data can be read to
indicate that it is the increased demand for the pollination services - mainly
almonds - that is behind the price hike. From the more global perspective,
the question of pollination remains a serious problem. Even in the USA, it
is not the case that all farmers can buy the pollination services. Moreover,
and apart from the cultivated crops, the other plants also need pollination.
As to the policy intervention, the U.S. honey price supporting scheme in-
deed appears a less inventive approach. It was eliminated in the 1996 Farm
Bill. However, the elimination of the program resulted in a reduction in the
availability of pollination services and an increase in the pollination fees. The
declines of the honeybee populations by implication lead to a further reduc-
tion of pollination services whereby the equilibrium fees increase further. As
the reasons for the decline of honeybee populations may be many a single
policy intervention may not be su¢cient. Use of particular insecticides may
be eliminated. Measures against parasites may be developed. Moreover, if
the movable pollinations services by trucks from other states to California
help to spread those parasites, more local services could be developed.
Our paper addresses the issue of optimal policy towards the honeybees.
However, before such an analysis can be undertaken, we plan to study the so-
10Yet, the number of the species can be amazingly large. There are ac-
tually 81 known species of bees, for example, in urban Berkely alone, see
htt://nature.berkeley.edu/urbanbeegardens/.
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cial and economic structure of honeybees and their biological roots. We also
want to document empirically the volatility and the risks faced by bee keep-
ers. In our model, the honeybee economies are considered as two-product
economic enterprises. They produce honey and they provide pollination ser-
vices. Honey has a limited role in most consumers consumption basket but
every consumer is yet dependent on the pollination externality. Farming
sector (bee keepers) is taken to be competitive with free but risky entry.
Each farmer is an expected utility-maximizing principal guided by Animal
Spirit(s).11 Farmers do not have the skill to collect the nectar from plants
to rene it into honey. They have to hire honeybees to do the job. As a
consequence, farmers and honeybees have organized their joint ventures in
terms of a principal-agent relationship. The honeybees are not without the
choice of freedom. Though badly, they are able to survive in many areas in
the world in the nature without humans. They can establish their production
unit on the facility provided by the nature instead of human colony owners.
Therefore, the participation constraint of the honeybees has to be introduced.
If the honeybees enter into a principal-agent relation with a capitalist farmer
the search cost and the set-up cost is lower.12 The second option, settling
down into the nature is more risky as the potential facilities in the nature
can be found not before a costly search, may not be ideal and are the subject
of enemy risks, like the weather or the bears. The decision of accepting the
principal-agent relation may not, however, be time consistent. This follows
from bounded rationality. The farmer being in a stronger bargaining posi-
tion can push the honeybees at their reservation utility when it is the time of
harvesting. The output, honey, which would represent a Gourmet meal for
honeybees is replaced by a regular sugar juice. At that point it is too late to
react.
When providing their labor input to collect nectar, honeybees are en-
gaged in Pareto-e¢cient exchange with owering plants. They reward for
the nectar by their pollination and procurer service. Such a mutually bene-
cial economic exchange has not been left unrecognized.13 Kahlil Gibran, the
11We model later in the paper the investment behavior of the farmers in terms of risk
aversion. Therefore, the notion of the Animal Spirits in the current paper di¤ers from the
Keynesian notion of Animal Spirits with speculative motives.
12This is thanks to L.L.Langstroth who invented the modern beehive, patented
in 1852. For additional information on his invention, the reader can consult
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langstroth_hive .
13The evolution of mutualism appears a puzzle. Foster and Wenseleers (2006) have
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Lebanese poet, one of the greatest since Shakerpeare, has given us a startling
moment in his The Prophet from 1923:
Go to your elds and your gardens, and you shall learn that it is the
pleasure of the bee to gather honey of the ower,
But it is also the pleasure of the ower to yield its honey to the bee.
For to the bee a ower is a fountain of life,
And to the ower a bee is a messenger of love,
And to both, bee and ower, the giving and the receiving of pleasure is a
need and an ecstasy.
Our paper di¤ers from those in the literature on several accounts. We
model the producers risks explicitly. As the markets for pollination services
do not operate globally, the paper considers the pollination services by hon-
eybees as an externality and approaches the policy issues as an optimal tax
problem. We introduce explicitly the externality on consumers welfare.14
In the presence of an externality, a question of optimal subsidy arises even
without the collapse of the honeybee populations. The paper is, however, not
only about e¢ciency and second best. Though the economy of honeybees has
remarkable e¢ciency properties it is also important to ask how they manage
the short-run volatility when compared with, say, capitalist economies. We
produce time series results on the volatility of honey industry comparing it
with that of the market economy of humans. The volatility appears di¤erent
from the GDP cycles of humans. Through the resulting volatility in pollina-
tion services, such volatility is adversely reected in consumers welfare.
The literature on optimal taxation under externalities suggests that a
subsidy policy might be justied. However, it is not feasible to subsidize the
honeybees directly. As production of honey and the pollination services are
complements, the paper considers a subsidy to farmers in the honey industry.
As lump sum taxes are not available a government has to rely on distortive
taxes which result in a welfare loss of their own. However, the subsidiza-
tion of honey producing industry might outweigh such a cost. Therefore, a
developed a model to explain why selection favours cooperation among species. They
found three key factors (i) high benet cost ratio, (ii) high within-species relatedness and
(iii) high between-species delity.
14There is a further reason to expect that the markets for pollination services are the
subject of some ine¢ciency. Those services have at least to some extent properties of
public goods. Indeed, the honeybees y up to 2-3 km, sometimes up to a 5 km distance to
collect the nectar. This can make their pollination service a public good on neighboring
farmers.
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social cost/benet analysis is needed. We assume a benevolent government
maximizing the expected welfare of human consumers and farmers.15 The
welfare function is taken to be utilitarian. As to the results, the paper derives
conditions as to when the optimal subsidy rate is positive. The answer turns
out to be an empirical one. It is shown that such a tax on consumers may
be positive regardless of the role of honey in the human consumption basket.
By implication, though sugar and honey are substitutes for humans in their
consumption basket but production of sugar does not provide similar posi-
tive externalities as honey, it is conceivable that sugar could be taxed while
honey could be subsidized in the tax optimum. This view is valid also due to
the fact that several ingredients with positive e¤ects on health from honey
have been detected while those are missing from sugar.16
2 Honeybees: democracy within a commu-
nist society17
In his famous book from 1714, The Fable of the Bees, Bernard Mandeville
describes a bee society thriving until the bees are suddenly made honest and
virtuous. Without their desire for personal gain, their economy collapses and
the remaining bees go to live simple lives in a hollow tree, thus implying that
without private vices there exists no public benet.
The truth is very di¤erent from that launched to us by Mandeville. At
the time, the book was a political satire against the English political system.
In contrast to such a view, honeybees can be regarded as working in the spirit
of Calvinist Ethics. Their economies have indeed been highly successful in
the long history of the evolution of life. Subsequently, Charles Darwin dis-
cussed the social insects in his On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural
Selection from 1859 starting to revolutionalize our understanding about the
living world. It was left, however to the modern evolutionary biology to pro-
15Why to forget the well-being of the working class, the honeybees? It is excluded for the
reason that the honeybees do not participate in the choice of the government. If included
in the welfare analysis, the social value of honeybees should be measured by their labor
input. One should notice the close analogy to the Marxian labor theory of value.
16See also Kwakman et al. (2010) on how honey kills bacteria.
17The metafora of democratic decision-making within a concensus-seeking assembly is
introduced by Seeley (2010). Indeed, it is remarkable that after the voting procedure, the
honeybees appear to nd the Condorcet winner!
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vide the desired insight starting with William Hamiltons theory of inclusive
tness from 1964. Indeed, the evolutionary biology has produced evidence
that also these fascinating creatures with a harmonius social order and the
ability to operate as a superorganism are subject of severe interest conicts.
Those arise between the old queen and new queen, between the candidates
for the new queen, between workers and drones, between drones competing
with neighboring drones for the right to mate with the queens etc.
To understand the evolutionary origins of such conicts, consider the
social structure of a honeybee society.18 The population of honeybees within
a beehive may amount up to 80.000 individuals 95 percent of which are female
workers. The Queens task is to produce eggs. Each summer day, the Queen
can lay 1500 or so eggs. Over the summer, the Queen can lay up to 150.000
eggs in the beehive. During the rst week of her life as the Queen, she ies
from her colonys hive mating with 10 to 20 males from the other hives.
She then stores the sperm and with each egg she lays, she decides whether
to dispense a few fertilizing sperm or to hold them back. In this way, she
determines the sex of her o¤spring: fertilized for female, unfertilized for male.
Whether a fertilized egg develops into a nonbreeding worker or an egg-laying
queen depends on how it is treated. If it is deposited in a standard-size cell in
the combs where after hatching into a larva it will be fed by the workers with
standard-quality larval food, it will develop into a worker. If a fertilized egg
is deposited in a large queen cell, the larva it gives rise to will be fed a lavish
diet of nutrient-rich secretions ("royal jelly") what produces a queen. The
Queen withholds sperm from less than 5 percent of her eggs which become
her sons, the colonys drones. When the puberty is achieved in about 12 days
of age, the drone will y from the hive a few miles from his home to chase a
neighboring queen. If he nds one and manages to outrace his rivals he will
inseminate her during the ight 10-20 meters up in the sky. This mission is,
however, fatal. Once the summer is over, the destiny of the drones is to be
kicked out from the beehive as they are then useless.
The rst step in early summer is the rearing of 10 or more queens, all
daughters of the mother queen. When these daughters develop, the mother
Queen undergoes changes that will prepare her for the departure in the
swarm. More dramatic, the mother Queen is sentenced to an astronaut
program: the workers begin to show mild hostility to their mother, shak-
ing, pushing, lightly and biting reducing her body weight and trimming her
18Most details in this section are based on Seeley (2010).
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into a ying pilot. The workers, to become the passengers of the swarm,
do the contrary. They ll up their stomach with honey thereby increasing
their body weight by about 50 percent. Ten thousand bees, about two-thirds
of the colony, take o¤! The current Queen is thus forced to leave the hive.
After her take-o¤, the scouts will busily search the neighborhood for candi-
date dwelling places and the information is passed by the waggle dance (see
below)! In the original beehive, the new candidates for the next queen enter
into a deadly ght until the winner is declared.
Honeybees have developed a highly sophisticated economic structure.
Their e¢cient division of labor is analogous to what Adam Smith (1776)
was suggesting for humans for e¢ciency reasons. There are two types of age-
related jobs: hive workers and eld workers. The household tasks include:
clean cells, feed larvae, build combs, ripen honey, ventilate hive, guard en-
trance (Seeley (2010)). The career program thus includes nursery, graduation
and training program (OMalley (2010)). In the spirit of the portfolio diversi-
cation, the honeybees view the multitude of owering plants and trees as an
insurance mechanism but in a clever manner. The eld workers will nd out
in which owers the nectar contains much sugar. Having found such a ower,
they refrain from switching to other owers. Flowering plants di¤er in terms
of their sensitivity to the weather. If some are destroyed by harsh weather,
the honeybees will visit others. In addition, they visit di¤erent owering
plants early and some others later in the summer. When the temperature
exceeds 14o Celcieus, each worker visits about 100 owers during the ight
carrying out up to 7 ights per day within a 2-3 km radius of the beehive.
The work e¤ort is substantial. Given that a foraging bee typically brings
home a nectar load weighing about 40 milligrams, a collection of nectar to
produce 20 kilograms of honey requires more than a million foraging trips by
a colonys workers.
The wings of the eld workers are the subject of depreciation during the
work process. There is no free-riding, no moral hazard, no labor legislation
on the working time. As a consequence, a honeybee captured in a glass, say,
does not stop moving but instead keeps going until her death. If the working
time in the cleaning of a beehive is shortened for some reason, the quality of
the cleaning is reduced and parasites appear destroying the honeybee society.
In their feet, honeybees have developed structures suitable for collecting,
managing and transporting the pollen. With their sucker, they can suck
nectar from owers and store it for the return ight in their stomach. While
humans rushed to develop private property rights honeybees economy is
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based on collective ownership of the nectar elds - a version of communism
and Soviet kolkhoz production culture.19 Also bumblebees, butteries and
many other insects collect nectar and pollinate. The technology of honeybees
is, however, more developed. They are the only insects which are able to store
the nectar as honey. Moreover, the honeybees have developed a production
technique to rene nectar into honey; they know how to add enzymes of their
own and eliminate the excess water from the nectar.
To understand the interest conicts within societies, it is important to
study how the rights to reproduce are allocated. The by now extensive biolog-
ical and evolutionary work is thoroughly reviewed by Ratnieks and Helanterä
in 2009. All society members among honeybees have the same mother but
can have a di¤erent farther. It is most striking, however, that workers - who
are all females - have reduced or abstracted from reproduction. The evolu-
tion of eusociality concerns, therefore, both the evolution of altruism and the
evolution of extreme inequality (Ratnieks and Helanterä (2009)). Reproduc-
tive inequality has reached a point with a single female almost exclusively
monopolizing reproduction. The determination of the rights to reproduce
may be viewed as an an e¢cient solution to maximize the survival chance in
the evolutionary process.20 One can hypothesize that it is determined jointly
with the solution to the e¢cient division of labor and incentives. A female
honeybee makes two life-history decisions that determine whether she will
reproduce or help (Ratnieks and Helanterä (2009)). Early in life, females
are totipotent who can develop into either a queen or a worker. In their
larval stage, the individual commits to developing either as a queen or as a
worker. In the adult stage, an individual that has developed into a worker
can activate its ovaries and lay egges or not. At both decision points, almost
all honeybee females take the non-reproductive option. As the Queen has
mated with approximately 10-20 males, this reduces the relatedness among
the females o¤springs to 0.3-0.275. This is the source of interest conicts
among the members. The idea of a harmonius honeybee society is a mislead-
ing illusion. There is genetic variation and for good reasons. The need for
variation arises from two reasons, the battles against parasites and the risk
of inbreeding. However, enforced altuism is also needed, i.e. social pressures
19It should be noted that the cooperation is not extended beyond the members of the
same community. Di¤erent hives compete for the nectar elds and information sharing
across hives is ruled out.
20On discussion of inclusive tness maximization and groupd adaptation see Grafen
(2009) and Garner and Grafen (2009).
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that deter individuals from attempting to reproduce, i.e. from the moral
hazard. Such an inequality does not, however, arise from voluntary altruism.
Ratnieks and Helanterä (2009) report:
"Even the highest family levels of kinship are insu¢cient to cause the
extreme inequality seen in e.g. honeybees via "voluntary altruism". En-
forced altruism is needed, i.e., social pressures that deter individuals from
attempting to reproduce. Coercion acts at two stages in an individual life
cycle. Queens are typically larger so larvae can be coerced into developing
into workers by being given less food. Workers are coerced into working by
policing, in which workers or the queen eat worker-laid eggs or aggress fer-
tile workers. The incentive to rebel is strong as an individual is the most
closely related to its own o¤spring. Queens are typically large and larvae can
be coerced into developing into workers by being given less food. Workers are
coerced into working by "policing" in which workers or the queen eat worker-
laid eggs or aggress fertile workers. The incentive to rebel is strong as an
individual is the most closely related ot its own o¤spring. However, because
individuals gain inclusive tness by rearing relatives, there is also a strong
incentive to acquisce to social coercion. In a queenright honeybee colony, the
policing of worker-laid eggs is very e¤ective, which results in most workers
working instead of attempting to reproduce. Thus, extreme altruism is due to
both kinship and coercion."
In the case of honeybees, worker policing is approximately 98 per cent
e¤ective in killing worker-laid eggs. Egg-laying workers are also the subject
of physical aggression. There is a strong relatedness incentive to rebel and
some workers are able to lay eggs that evade egg policing though honeybee is
now the species with the lowest proportion of egg-laying workers (Ratnieks
and Helanterä (2009)).
An important consequence of the fact that eusocial insect societies are
families is acquiescence by coerced individuals. There is a strong incentive
for evasion given that individuals are more related to their own sons than to
the Queens sons (incentive to evade control over the worker production of
males) and to their own o¤spring versus their sisters o¤spring. But living in
a family also means that individuals who are coerced into a non-reproductive
role do not have zero inclusive tness. In the case of honeybees, for example,
workers are approximately half as related to the female and male o¤spring
being reared in the colony as the queen (Ratnieks and Helanterä (2009)).21
21In human societies, reproduction rights are often an issue. Most countries have ex-
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Figure 1: The Amazing Waggle Dance of Honeybees. Source: Wikipedia
One analogy sometimes used to describe an insect society is that of a
factory (Oster and Wilson (1978)). It is a factory in which the working in-
dividuals are not as well paid as the boss or owner (the queen). But neither
are they badly paid. There are few human businesses or organizations in
which the highest salary is only twice the lowest, as in the case honeybees
(Ratnieks and Helanterä (2009)). Many insect societies, including the hon-
eybees have almost entirely resolved their internal conicts over reproduction
via coercion. Thus, the natural selection can cause societies to become more
organism-like, so that the actions of all or most individuals serve colony
rather than individual interest.
The astonishing "waggle dance" of honeybees (see Figure 2) is among the
great miracles of life (cf. Seeley (2010)). Several hundred bees act collectively
and almost always make a good choice of the colonys living quarters. The
house-hunting bees scour the neighborhood for potential nest sites, report
the news of their discoveries, conduct a frank debate about these options,
and ultimately reach an agreement about which site will be their colonys
new dwelling place.
When colonies become overcrowded only about a third of the worker bees
stay at home and rear a new queen while the other two-thirds of the workforce
cessive population growth while China has exercised its one child policy. Moreover, the
rights to contraception and abortion are striking issues.
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- a group of some ten thousand - rushes o¤ with the old queen to create a
daughter colony. The swarm will eld several hundred house hunters to
explore some 70 square kilometers of the surrounding landscape for potential
homesites, evaluate the possibilities with respect to the multiple criteria that
dene bees dream home, and democratically select a favorite for their new
domicile. Even though each individual has limited information and limited
intelligence, the group as a whole makes rst-rate collective decisions (Seeley
(2010)).
Most amazing is the ability of a worker honeybee in informing her hive
mates of the direction and distance to a rich food source by means of dance
behavior, the waggle dance. In this performance, the dancer walks straight
ahead on the vertical surface of a comb, waggling her body from side to side,
then she stops and turns left or right to make a semicircular return run back
to her starting point, whereupon she produces another waggle run followed
by another return run, and so on. Each waggle dance consists, therefore,
of a series of dance circuits, and each dance circuit contains a waggle run
and a return run. Unemployed foragers start to trail her as dance-followers
and nally rush out of the hive to search for the bonanza (Seelay (2010)).
The duration of the waggle run is directly proportional to the length of the
outward journey. On average, one second represents some 1000 meters of
ight. The angel of the waggle dance, relative to the straight up on the
vertical comb represents the angle of the outward journey relative to the
direction of the sun. For example, if the waggling bee heads 40 degrees to
the right of vertical, her message is: The feeding place is 40 degrees to the
right of the sun."22
Despite the communist nature of the honeybees society with workers dic-
tatorship in reproduction, the economic decisions are made democratically.
The voting mechanism is based on the majority rule and is analogous to the
Swiss democracy though with the special feature that only females vote.
As to the safety of the society, it is based on a defence system, a pub-
lic good, where an outside threat to the beehive is communicated for the
members of society by a chemical called pheromon. The task of the workers
defending the colony resembles that of the kamikaze pilots in that both die
after their operation. The human kamikatze pilots, however, were persuaded
22Subsequently, Martin Lindauer, a graduate student of Karl von Frisch discovered
bees performing waggle dances on the swarms surface over the backs of other bees. He
concluded that these were nest-site scouts verifying this guess subsequently by his eld
work with nine swarm (Seeley (2010)).
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by sake wine and with underprovision of gasolene for the return.
To add one more amazing achievement of honeybees, their architectural
abilities are striking. They know precisely how to build the hexagonal cells.
As another example of related eusocial animals, termites, one can just admire
their skill in having developed e¢cient air conditioning systems in their nest.
3 Empirical regularities
3.1 The Production of honey and the gross national
product: the basic statistical properties
This section addresses the volatility and riskiness of the honey producing
industry. It also explores whether any connection to the aggregate production
in the economy can be detected. We work with data from Finland. Chart 1
shows the production of honey per colony of bees in kilograms in Finland in
1980-2011 and the Finnish Gross National Product (GNP) in constant (year
2000) prices in millions of euros also in 1980-2011.
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Chart 1. Honey and GNP
We report some key empirical observations.
(i) The average output of honey per colony is constant over time - there
is no trend - but the output of honey is subject of strong year-to-year uc-
tutations. The annual reductions may exceed 50 % from the previous year.
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Below we establish that those uctuations lead to a negative relationship
between the current and previous levels in the output of honey. Such uctu-
ations cannot arise from the activities of honeybees within their beehive as
their life cycle is short. New generations are born for each season. Moreover,
and in the spirit of the portfolio diversication, the multitude of owering
plants and trees can be viewed as an insurance mechanism for honeybees.
Flowering plants di¤er in terms of their sensitivity to the weather. If some
are destroyed by harsh weather, the honeybees will visit others. In addition,
they visit di¤erent owering plants early and some others later in the sum-
mer. Even such an insurance does not isolate them from the risks caused by
the weather conditions. Moreover, they have to abstain from their pilot role
when the air temperature falls below 14 degrees Celcius. Economic risks in
their economy are substantial. While the time series of the output of honey
appears stationary with no clear outliers, the GNP shows a dominating up-
ward trend indicating non-stationarity.
(ii) The economy of humans has produced two severe recessions during
the data period. The honeybee economy has none but its annual uctuations
are more dramatic than the uctuations in the human economy.
(iii) For illustrative purposes as well as for statistical analysis, we also
consider the di¤erences between Honey and GNP. The di¤erences of the
time series xt, t = 1, 2, ... ,n are dened by
Dxt = xt ¡ xt¡1; t = 2; 3; :::; n:
The di¤erences of the production of honey and the GNP are given in
Chart 2.
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Chart 2. DHoney and DGNP
Both Honey and its di¤erence DHoney can easily be stationary as time
series since no obvious trends or cyclical variation can be seen in their time
series. Note that two recessions in the years 1991-1994 and 2008-2009 are
clearly visible in the plots of the variables GNP and DGNP. The visual obser-
vations of Honey being stationary and the GNP in di¤erences are conrmed
by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests.
3.2 Volatility, periodicity and spectral analysis
The standard deviation SD and the coe¢cient of variation CV of the obser-
vations are commonly used measures for the volatility of a time series. We
are especially interested in the potential cyclical changes in volatility since
they can reveal hidden periodicities in time series. Potential cycles in Honey
may arise from the farmers investment behavior. Therefore we computed
d-point moving volatilities of Honey and GNP for d = 3, 5, 11 . The plots
of these moving volatilities in the case of d = 5 are given in Chart 3.
The volatility of Honey seems to have cycles with the period of 7-8 years.
However the volatility of the variable GNP does not show any stable cycli-
cal behaviour. This is, however, clearly due to the dominance of the two
recessions in the years 1991-1994 and 2008-2009. Both series witness high
volatility but of rather di¤erent character.
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Chart 3. 5-Point Moving Volatility (Standard Deviation) of Honey and
GNP
The spectra of Honey and DHoney series (Chart 4) are compatible with
the stationarity of these series. Moreover, faint evidence of cyclical variation
can be seen in the spectra of Honey and DHoney with about 6 years length.
This appears consistent with what we reported from the variation of the
volatility. The spectrum of the GNP on the other hand indicates clearly the
nonstationarity of the GNP, while the spectrum of the variable DGNP is
compatible with the stationary nature of the variable DGNP (see Chart 5).
The cyclical behavior of the DGNP is dominated by the two recession years.
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Chart 4. Spectra of Honey and DHoney.
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Chart 5. Spectra of GNP and DGNP
3.3 ARMA-models
Based on the correlation analysis, we introduced AR(1)-, MA(1)- and ARMA(1,1)-
models to Honey, DHoney, GNP and DGNP. The summary of the estimation
results from the best models are given here.
In the case of Honey, all the estimated models pass the Portmanteau
tests on the residuals at least up to lag 29. All the AR-, MA- and ARMA-
parameters are insignicant in the estimated models. The best model among
these estimated models is the AR(1)-model with a negative coe¢cient, -0.275.
This means that the annual production of honey depends - negatively - on
the production of the previous year (slightly) but not of the productions of
the earlier years.
Also in the case of the variable DHoney, all the estimated models pass
the Portmanteau tests on the residuals at least up to lag 29. The AR-
parameter in the AR(1)-model and the MA-parameter in the MA(1)-model
are signicant also in the case of di¤erenced production of honey while now it
is the MA-parameter that is signicant in the ARMA(1,1)-model. Since the
RMSE of the residuals of the MA(1)-model is slightly lower than the RMSE
of the AR(1)-model, the MA(1)-model can be considered the winner in the
case of the variable DHoney. If one compares the estimated models on the
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variables Honey and DHoney, one can again see some indications of slight
overdi¤erencing in the variable DHoney.
In the case the variable GNP, we can clearly see the e¤ects of the nonsta-
tionary nature of the GNP in the estimation results from the three models
that were applied to the data. The residuals of the AR(1)-model pass the
Portmanteau tests at least up to lag 29, but although the AR-parameter is
signicant, it is very near to one indicating the need of di¤erencing.
In the AR(1)-model for the variable DGNP, the AR-parameter is not sig-
nicant, but nevertheless the residuals of the model pass the Portmanteau
tests at least up to lag 29. In the MA(1)-model the MA-parameter is sig-
nicant and the residuals of the model pass the Portmanteau tests at least
up to the lag 29. The residuals of the ARMA(1,1)-model pass the Port-
manteau test at least up to lag 29, but both parameters of the model are
non-signicant. On the basis of these estimation results, we can conclude
that MA(1) is an appropriate model for the variable DGNP. This means
that the yearly changes of the GNP depend on all the previous changes.
The key conclusion is that the two time series analyzed di¤er substantially
in their internal structures.
3.4 Cross-correlations
The main question here is whether the time series of honey output is re-
lated to the economic state of the economy or whether is fully determined
by exogenous variables like the weather. Such a dependence may arise from
the farmers investment choices. For this purpose, the cross-correlations be-
tween Honey and DGNP are given below. Because the time-series properties
of Honey and GNP are so di¤erent, one should not expect to nd close
relationships, say in terms of Granger-causality around zero-lags. Interest-
ing enough, we observe cross-correlations which are mildly signicant but at
more distant lags and leads, see Chart 6. Those observations point to some
interaction between the honeybee economy and the human economy. Below
we study using it a regression equation.
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Chart 6. Cross-Correlation Function of Honey and DGNP
3.5 Stochastic di¤erence equation
Our aim is to estimate a stochastic di¤erence equation with the production
of honey as the dependent variable and both its lagged value and the lagged
values of the di¤erenced GNP as the explanatory variables. As tools in the
model building, we introduced distributed lag models selecting the signicant
explanatory variables. The result is (the t-values in parenthesis)
Honeyt = 50.2 - 0.590 Honeyt¡1 + 0.000482 DGNPt
(7:9) (¡3:2) (1:5)
+ 0.000184 DGNPt¡6 + 0.000109 DGNPt¡9
(3:6) (2:1)
The coe¢cient of multiple determination R2 is 0.521. The model is sta-
tistically signicant (F = 4.62 with p = 0.01); joint variation is detected.
The residuals are normally distributed and the autocorrelations of the resid-
uals are not prominent. In the production series, it is the internal structure
21
which dominates. The negative sign of the coe¢cient of the lagged produc-
tion, -0.590, is consistent with the autocorrelation structure and spectrum of
production. We have been unable to explain the detected e¤ects at lags 6
and 9. They may have to do with the two recessions in the GDP time series.
The goodness of the t of the model is shown below.
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Chart 7. Goodness-of-Fit of the Model
4 A principal-agent economic model
4.1 Farmers and honeybees: labor contract
Farmers do not have the skill of collecting the nectar from owering plants
to rene it into honey. They hire honeybees to do the job receiving the com-
pensation in terms of a new home which even ts for winter habitation. As a
consequence, honeybees and farmers organize their joint ventured in terms of
a principal-agent relationship. In this section, we model this relationhsip.23
23Pollination fees and honey revenue amount to bee wages (Cheung (1973)). Our ap-
proach, however, abstracts from the organized market for pollination services as they do
not globally exist.
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This task is, however, easier than with human principal-agent relations: the
Calvinist Ethics adopted by the honeybees in their labor e¤ort, the need
for monitoring disappears. The farmer invests in a beehive and provides a
candidate for a hive for the honeybee colony to settle; the honeybees provide
the labor e¤ort. The output is produced by honeybees with innitely elastic
supply of their population, H.
The industry is competitive with free entry but the industry is highly
risky. The weather conditions create the main source of risks though one
should not forget the potential visits of bears who have developed an ad-
diction to honey.24 The risks result in the volatility studied above. The
producers have imperfect information about the market price when they un-
dertake their investment. The capital markets do not provide an insurance.
An income tax with loss o¤set could provide an insurance as is well known
since Domar and Musgrave (1944). The loss o¤set provisions are, however,
typically imperfect. Therefore, we do not study the income tax but focus on
an optimal subsidy as an insurance device. Earlier Mayshar (1977) has ad-
dressed the case for the subsidization of risky private projects in the context
of an income tax, redistribution and uncorrelated shocks between produc-
ers, based essentially on the Sandmo (1972) model.25 In Sandmo (1972) and
Mayshar (1977), the farmers essentially form an insurance arrangement be-
tween each other (via an active government) based on an income tax while
in our model the insurance is provided by the income tax on consumers. In
their model, projects can be viewed independent while we work out the case
where the shocks are industry-wide. There is thus a helpful tax externality
e¤ect in our model: taxing consumers provides a hedge for producers!
We thus consider a second-best subsidy policy where the government
provides a subsidy per unit of investment. The governments intervention is
asymmetric in the model: no income tax is levied on farmers, it is only the
probability of making a loss which is reduced.
The time line of the model is as follows. In the rst stage, the subsidy
policy is set up under productive uncertainty in the honey industry. In the
second stage, the number of producers is determined; they all invest in risky
24While the loss of an individual bee keeper can amount even to 60 percent of his hives
during a winter, the survival rate over winter of the beehives is small especially for new
honeybee colonies living in trees or houses. Seeley (2010) found that in the state New
York, for example, less than 25 percent of those would be alive in the following spring. In
contrast, however, almost 80 percent of the established colonies could survive in that area.
25We exclude the possibility where the government takes the role of the producer.
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capacity. In the third stage, the uncertainty is resolved and the total output
of the industry is determined. In the nal stage, consumers observe the price
and make their consumption and labor supply decisions.
We introduce the expected utility framework of von Neumann and Mor-
genstern.26 Each farmer has an initial wealth normalized to one and is as-
sumed to have a strictly concave utility function v(w) of the terminal wealth
w. Then, v0(w) > 0, v00(w) < 0. Their objective is taken to be the max-
imization of the expected utility E [v(w)]. Each has access to a safe asset
yielding zero return and each can invest a fraction k of the assets in the risky
honey industry while investing a fraction z in the riskfree asset with k+ z =
1. Then, k measures the size of the enterprise, i.e. a number of hives. The
stochastic production function of each farmer is taken to be linear,
y = (1 + ´)k; (1)
where y is output and ´ is assumed to be a farmer-specic random variable
and continuously distributed on the interval [¡1,1) with zero expected value
and ¾´ as its standard deviation:27 The risky investment has to be made prior
to the realization of its risky return. As a result of the shocks, the market
price of honey, denoted by p; is stochastic. Were the production shocks
producer-specic, we would have E[p´] = cov(p; ´) = 0: However, when the
shocks are industry-wide and do not vanish in the aggregate, the covariance
between the production shock and the price is negative by the law of demand,
E[p´] = cov( p; ´) < 0. The rational producer understands this mechanism.
A farmers return per unit of investment is given by
¼ = p (1 + ´) + s¡ c; (2)
where c is the production cost per capital invested and s is the subsidy rate
on investment. It is assumed that s < c.28 Hence, the nal wealth is given
by
w = k(1 + ¼) + z:
26We notice that the honeybees start their working e¤ort in the morning when the
morning star still sparkles but subject to the condition that the weather temperature
exceeds 14o Celcius.
27Each beehive occupies a constant number of honeybees. As the supply of honeybees as
a production factor is innitely elastic they do enter explicitly in the production function.
28This condition is introduced to avoid the problem of moral hazard.
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Each farmers maximization problem is
max
k
E [v (w)] : (3)
The expected utility can be written as
E [v (w)] =
Z 1
0
Z 1
¡1
v (w) f(´; p)d´dp
where f(´; p) is the joint density of p and ´:
The rst-order condition for an interior solution, k > 0; can be written
as
E
·
v0 (w)
µ
@w
@k
¶¸
= 0; (4)
where and to recall w = k(1+¼)+ z; @w=@k = 1+¼: The second-order con-
dition for a maximum is satised by the assumption of concavity. Rewritten
the rst-order condition as
E [v0 (k(1 + ¼) + z) (1 + p (1 + ´) + s¡ c)] = 0; (5)
this condition determines the optimal investment k: The solution for the
optimal investment is positive if and only if E [¼] > 0 (Arrow (1970)). The
equilibrium with k > 0 thus has to be characterized by the condition
E [p]¡ c > ¡cov [p; ´]¡ s: (6)
We now have a few conclusions at hand. Take for a moment the case
with producer-specic risks, i.e. cov [p; ´] = 0 and no subsidy. Were the
producers risk-neutral, the industry equilibrium would be characterized by
E [p]¡c = 0: It follows from risk-aversion that the industry equilibrium has to
be characterized by E [p]¡c > 0: Consequently, the expected industry output
is smaller.29 By how much smaller depends on the price elasticity of demand.
If the shocks are industry-wide, the producers rationally anticipate that an
additional investment reduces the industry price. In the rational expectations
industry equilibrium, the market price has to be greater. Therefore
Lemma 1. Risk aversion creates a wedge between the expected market
price and the production cost. Industry-wide production shocks raise the mag-
nitude of this wedge in the industry equilibrium.
29A similar result was derived by Sandmo (1971) long ago for a competitive rm under
price undertainty.
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We also notice from above that a subsidy reduces the wedge between the
expected market price and the production cost by increasing the expected
industry output.
The above analysis was built on a given subsidy rate s: Consider then
a di¤erent question: what happens to investment when the subsidy rate is
changed. Given that the shocks are industry-wide it becomes important to
understand what the farmer expects of the resulting equilibrium industry
price, E [p].30 To solve for the e¤ect on investment, di¤erentiate the rst-
order condition with respect to s to obtain
E
·
v00 (w)
@w
@s
(1 + ¼) + v0(w)
¸
= 0;
as @¼=@s = 1:
Now,
@w
@s
=
@k
@s
(1 + p (1 + ´) + s¡ c) + k:
Inserting,
E
·
v00 (w)
v0(w)
(
@k
@s
)(1 + p (1 + ´) + s¡ c) + k) (1 + ¼)]
¸
= ¡1:
This gives
@k
@s
=
1
E[a(w)(1 + p (1 + ´) + s¡ c) + k) (1 + ¼)] > 0 (7)
where
a(w) = ¡v00(w)=v0(w) > 0
is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. We can state
Lemma 2. An increase in the subsidy rate raises the optimal invest-
ment at the producer level, @k=@s > 0 regardless of its e¤ect on the expected
market price. In particular, even when the expected market p is reduced, the
investment incentive prevails.
30A rational farmer tries to predict the new industry price given that he expects all
farmers to respond to the new subsidy rate. Without examining the full industry equilib-
rium explicitly, this section takes a more modest step characterizing the behavior of an
individual farmer. This is no limitation as the farmers are alike.
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We notice that in the case of an exponential utility, the risk aversion
function a(w) = ¡v00(w)=v0(w) is constant, say a > 0. Then, the investment
e¤ect reads as
@k
@s
=
1
aE[(1 + p (1 + ´) + s¡ c) + k) (1 + ¼)] > 0:
We nd:
Lemma 3. The greater is the rate of risk aversion, the smaller is the
investment e¤ect of the subsidy.
Though we have not modelled the industry equilibrium explicitly the
outcome apparently is linked to the price elasticity of demand. If the demand
is price elastic - a natural assumption in the case of honey - the price cannot
decline much even though the output is increased.
Suppose now that m producers have entered into the industry. The re-
alized total output, Y; is obtained by aggregating the outputs of individual
producers. Then, it holds that
Y = my(s):
Finally, in what follows, we denote the indirect utility of producers bybv = bv(p; s; c; ¾´) with bvp > 0; bvs > 0, bvc < 0 and bv¾´ < 0: We consider the
case where a greater risk aversion implies a lower utility of each realization
of the random variable ´:
4.2 The preferences of honeybees: work as Calvinist
virtue
Honeybees make decisions and choices. They pick up owering plans from
their portfolio optimally giving up some of them and moving to the next
ones. They reoptimize the location of their beehive and vote democratically
on the new location. When it comes to model the labor e¤ort of the working
class, it appears that it is genetically programmed to provide the maximum
labor e¤ort. The preferences of honeybees appear to be determined by the
evolution to abstain from leisure. In the spirit of Calvinist Ethics, work e¤ort
appears as a virtue instead of a cost for their superorganism. The honeybees
have to eat - they eat honey - but they economize on their consumption. Such
Calvinist preferences can be modelled. Denote the size of working honeybee
population by H: The total labor input therefore is L = H = Y . When
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Figure 2: The Indi¤erence Curves of Honeybee Workers
their consumption of honey is denoted by C
h
; their utility function, taken to
be linear, can be expressed as
z(Ch; L) = C
h
+ °L; ° > 0: (8)
Thus, the indi¤erence curves on the (L,C
h
) space are vertical lines starting
at point Ch = C
h
and are depicted in Figure 3.
The Calvinist preferences do not satisfy the conventional neoclassical as-
sumptions assumed for humans. However, they have the appealing property
that they maximize the fertility and the tness of the society.
Many textbooks in economics take the interaction of the honeybees and
the apple orhards as examples of positive externalities between the two farm-
ers. Our model provides a complementary perspective: a Pareto-e¢cient
exchange between the owering plants and honeybees.
4.3 Honeybees participation constraint
Before proceeding, there is one point to be discussed. Choosing the right
dwelling place is a matter of life or death for a honeybee colony (Seeley
(2010)). The honeybees are not without the choice of freedom. They can
establish their production unit on the facility provided by human colony
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owner or, alternatively, provided by the nature. In many areas, they are
able to survive in the nature without humans though the risks are great.
Moreover, if and when the beehive gets crowded the old Queen is imposed
on leaving the beehive with two thirds of its populstion following her. There
may or there may not be unoccupied beehives available.
The participation incentives of the honeybees have therefore to be exam-
ined. If the nest is established in the nature, there is a search and set-up
cost C > 0. It would be avoided by accepting the beehive provided by the
farmer. In the nature, the technical e¢ciency is more limited than it is in
a human-made beehive. However, the bee society has the ownership right
to the whole return on production though challenged by the bears and rival
bee colonies. In areas with a cold winter, the beehive in the nature cannot
survive over the winter but in other areas it can. Part of the risk thus is that
there may be close-by beehives and the members of the neighboring society
may try to steal the honey.31 In what follows we rule out the issue of the
tragedy of commons.
In the geographical areas where the summer is short the cost cost of
building the beehive in the nature is great and there is an opportunity cost in
terms of some foregone nectar. We thus introduce the self-selection constraint
of the honeybees in terms of the choice of the location of their colony. We
suggest that the farmer takes up the role of Stackelberg-leader and that his
bargaining position is strong enough to push the honeybee society on its
reservation utility level.
The fraction of honey eaten by the honeybees is denoted by 1¡½: There-
fore, the fraction ½ of the output y remains in the colony. There is an interest
conict between the principal and the agents: the principal harvests a share
0 < h < 1 of the output ½y leaving for the Queen and the surviving members
over the winter of the reservation output, (1¡ h) ½y: Moreover, the farmer
has the option of replacing the honey with a sugar juice when harvesting
to make the bees survive over the winter. The sugar juice is part of the
farmers production cost. For the honeybees, honey would be comparable to
a Gourmet meal while sugar juice represents regular food.
The time-consistency problem arises as follows: when the honey is har-
vested the honeybees have no more available the choice of relocation. It is
too late! For a forward looking decision maker, the rejection of the principal-
31We also notice that plant protection based on chemicals and used in the agricultural
industry make the work by honeybees risky.
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agent relation had been rational if
yN ¡ C ¸ (1¡ h)±y
where yN = output in the natures nest. Whether the time consistency
problem arises or not depends on the net return yN ¡ C when the natures
location is chosen. In areas with a short summer, the beehive o¤ered by
the human owner satises the participation constraint ex post, too. In other
areas, it may not. The participation constraint should be interpreted in
terms of expectations. There is uncertainty as to how far away the ower
elds are from the beehive provided by the farmer and what is their quality.32
In our analysis above, we have assumed that the participation constraint is
not violated.
4.4 Consumption, the quality of life, and the missing
market
We start with the key ecological relationship: the pollination services ren-
dered by honeybees provide a rich number of varieties of food for consumers
not to mention their quality. This is the essence of the externality available
for the humans. With missing markets, human consumers, however, cannot
reward the honeybees for this service. We make the assumption that the
value of the pollination services determines the quality of life and is directly
linked to the total population of honeybees, H. However, the value of the
pollination services is the subject of the same shock, ´; as is the ouput of
honey,
q = µH + "´; µ > 0; " > 0: (9)
There are n consumers in the economy. Their utility depends not only on
the size of their consumption basket but also on its quality. The preferences
of consumers are thus dened both on the amount of their consumption ci;
the quality of consumption q > 0, on the amount of leisure li; and on the
amount of honey consumed. All consumers value the quality and the amount
of consumption equally. The quality of life and the amount of consumpion
32The quality of honey varies from an area to another. The San Giorgio Monastery, a
former Benedictine monastery in Venice, located on the island of San Giorgio Maggiore, is
famous for its high-quality varieties of herb honey. In the Northern Lapland, the cloudberry
honey is a speciality. Di¤erent varieties of city honey are available between those areas.
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are substitutes. Consumers are heterogenous in regard to consumption of
honey. They have, however, the same quasi-linear preference map over other
commodities which is represented by the common utility function u:
ui = u(qci; li) + Ãicih (10)
where ci = consumption basket of goods without honey, ch = consumption
of honey and Ãi ¸ 0: For some consumers, Ãi > 0; for others Ãi = 0: The
policy analysis goes through however small Ãi is as long as it is positive for
some consumers. At the time when the consumers make their choices the
uncertainties in the model have resolved.
We introduce a at labor income tax making consumption equal to labor
income net of taxes. Denoting t = constant marginal tax rate for all con-
sumers, T = an exogenous income of consumers, ei = labor supply, ei+li = 1;
and denoting w = the wage rate of consumers, the consumers budget con-
straint becomes
ci + pcih = (1¡ t)wei + T: (11)
The Lagrangian functions are
max
ci;cih;l
i
Lh =
£
u(qci; li) + Ãicih
¤
+ ¸ih
£
(1¡ t)wei + T ¡ ci ¡ pcih
¤
; if Ãi > 0
(12)
max
ci;li
Lo =
£
u(qci; li)
¤
+ ¸io
£
(1¡ t)wei + T ¡ ci¤ ; if Ãi = 0: (13)
The marginal utilities of income have been denoted by ¸ih and ¸
i
o: Max-
imization yields the set of rst-order conditions for those consumers whose
consumption basket includes honey, i.e. Ãi > 0;
quc ¡ ¸ih = 0
¸ihp = Ã
i
¡ul + ¸i(1¡ t)w = 0:
They determine the optimal decisions, ci¤; ci¤h ; e
i¤: For those consumers
who do not consume honey, Ãi = 0 and the second rst-order condition
drops out.
If Ãi > 0, the solution can be stated as
ci = ci(t; w; T; q; Ãi; p) (14)
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cih = c
i
h(t;w; T; q; Ã
i; p) (15)
ei = ei(t; w; T; q; Ãi; p): (16)
If Ãi = 0; the solution is
ci = ci(t; w; T; q) (17)
ei = ei(t; w; T; q): (18)
We make the standard assumption that leisure is a normal good, so that
labor supply is decreasing in T: The net wage rate then has substitution and
income e¤ects that are of opposite signs. A rise in the income tax rate t
results in a decline in the net wage. This inceases the demand for leisure
and reduces the supply of labor through the substitution e¤ect. There is,
however, also the income e¤ect. If leisure is a normal good its demand is
reduced through the income e¤ect when the net wage declines. Therefore, as
is well-known, the tax e¤ect on labor supply is ambiguous.
We denote the maximized value of the utility, the indirect utility of those
who consumer honey by buih = buh(t; w; T; q; Ãi; p): Its derivatives are developed
as buiht = ¡¸ihwei¤h < 0buihT = ¸ih
buihq = ¸ih µci¤hq
¶
> 0
buihp = ¡¸ihci¤h < 0:
For those who do not consumer honey, the indirect utility is written as buio =buo(t; w; T; q; Ãi) with partial derivatives
buiot = ¡¸iowei¤o < 0buioT = ¸io
buioq = ¸io µci¤oq
¶
> 0:
Note that their welfare is dependent of the pollination service, too, but
independent of the market price of honey.
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5 Optimal policy towards honeybee colonies
This section studies the question of optimal taxation under externalities and
private risk aversion which both result in suboptimal allocation. The pol-
lination services of honeybees for owering plants are fundamental to the
human welfare. The strong evidence of their decline is alarming. Prospects
of a dramatic decline cannot be ruled out. The pollination services cannot be
subsidized directly. We ask whether welfare gains are available if the taxpay-
ers money is used to subsidize the complementary product to pollination, i.e.
the production of honey. A case is studied where to combat the risks associ-
ated with pollination services, the government levies taxes on consumers and
subsidizes the industry which produces honey. We highlight the mechanisms
involved and their role for the proper ecological policy. We study the case
for the absence of a corner solution i.e. that the optimal subsidy is positive
though it has to be nanced by costly taxation. The analysis builds on the
optimal tax theory under externalities.
We consider a benevolent government maximizing the expected welfare
of human consumers and human farmers. The welfare function is taken to
be of a utilitarian variant. A fat left tail in its probability distribution would
suggest a positive social risk aversion. Such a problem, however, is highly
complicated given the stochastic structure of the model. In the current paper,
a more modest government approach is adopted. The government is taken to
be risk neutral in formulating its program. Thus, it is assumed to maximize
the expected welfare. This approach is not di¢cult to be motivated: given
the short cycles in the honey industry, the policy strategy can be based on
frequent trial and error procedure.
The time line is as follows (see Figure 4). The government decides on its
tax and subsidy policy under uncertainty of the production shocks faced by
the producers. Then, the producers undertake their investment facing the
same uncertainty but knowing the tax policy. In the next stage, the "nature
moves" and the shocks are realized. In the nal stage, the consumers decide
on their consumption and labor supply decisions. The welfare function to be
maximized is
max
t;s
E [W (t; s)] = §nE
¡buih + buio¢+§mEbvi: (19)
The ex ante budget constraint of the government states the equality be-
tween the expected tax revenue and the total subsidies,
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Figure 3: Time Line of the Economic Model
E
£
t§nw
¡
eih + e
i
o
¢ ¡ S¤ = 0 (20)
where S = msk denotes the expenditures in the subsidy program. Starting
with a zero subsidy rate and a zero tax rate, a welfare-increasing variation
in the subsidy and tax policy has to satisfy the following condition
@E[W (s; t)]
@s
ds+
@E[W (s; t)]
@t
µ
@t
@s
¶
ds ¸ 0: (21)
From the budget constraint, one can nd out by how much the income
tax rate has to be adjusted if the producers are subsidized,
dt
ds
=
E[dS=ds]
E[§nw (eih + eio) + t§nw (@e
i
h=@t+ @eio=@t)]
: (22)
The rst term in the denominator (which is positive) tells the income tax
base at the current tax rate. The greater the wage level is, or more generally,
the richer the population is by its income, the smaller is the required tax rate.
The second term indicates by how much the tax base is eroded or grown if
the tax rate is raised. Indeed, the tax e¤ect on labor supply, say X , can have
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either sign. If it is the substitution e¤ect between labor supply and leisure
which dominates the income e¤ect, we have
w
@§nei
@t
= X < 0 for both eih and e
i
o:
If it is the income e¤ect which dominates (which is more likely for high-income
populations), we have
w
@§nei
@t
= X > 0 for both eih and e
i
o:
Together with the wage level, the labor supply e¤ect determines the required
tax rate.
Lemma 4. A tax-nanced subsidy necessitates a small tax rate in the
case of a high-income population, also likely to be characterized by the income
e¤ect dominating the substitution e¤ect in the labor supply.
Having a corner solution with zero optimal subsidy and tax rates is not, of
course, ruled out. To establish the case, it is helpful to search for the solution
to the optimal tax problem. The optimal subsidy and tax rates, t¤; s¤, cannot
be derived explicitly. However, they and the mechanisms involved can be
characterized. We have denoted the industry output by Y = my = m(1+´)k
and as H = Y; we can express the quality of life as q = µY + "´: The
Lagrangian function is given by
L(t; s) = §nE
¡buih + buio¢+§mEbvi+¹E £t§nw ¡eih + eio¢ ¡ S¤+ °t+ ±s (23)
where ¹ stands for the non-negative shadow price of the government budget
constraint and the °¡ and ±¡ parameters are shadow prices of the non-
negativity constraints, t¤ ¸ 0; s¤ ¸ 0. The Kuhn-Tucker rst-order condi-
tions are33
@L
@t
= E
·
@§n (buih + buio)
@t
+ ¹§nw
¡
eih + e
i
o
¢
+ ¹t
@§nw (eih + e
i
o)
@t
+ °
¸
= 0
(24)
33The tax rate has an impact on the producer in his role as a consumer but not as a
producer which on the other hand is a¤ected by the subsidy rate.
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@L
@s
= E
µ
@§n (buih + buio)
@q
@q
@Y
@Y
@s
+
@§n (buih + buio)
@p
@p
@s
¶
+
E
µ
§m
bvi
@s
¡ ¹@S
@s
+ ±
¶
= 0: (25)
@L
@¹
¹ =
£
t§nw
¡
eih + e
i
o
¢ ¡msk¤¹; ¹ ¸ 0 (26)
@L
@°
° = t° = 0; ° ¸ 0 (27)
@L
@±
± = s± = 0; ± ¸ 0: (28)
We notice
@§n (buih + buio)
@t
= ¡¸ihwei¤h ¡ ¸iowei¤o < 0
@Y
@s
=
@m
@s
(1 + ´)k +m(1 + ´)
@k
@s
> 0
@§n (buih + buio)
@eq = ¸ih
µ
ci¤heq
¶
+ ¸io
µ
ci¤oeq
¶
> 0
@q
@Y
= µ > 0
§m
@bvi
@p
@p
@s
< 0:
Having a corner solution with t¤ = s¤ = 0 is not, of course, ruled out.
The necessary condition for a corner solution is that ° > 0 in which case
E
·
@§n (buih + buio)
@t
¸
= ¡E¹
·
§nw
¡
eih + e
i
o
¢
+ t
@§nw (eih + e
i
o)
@t
¸
¡ ° < 0:
When it comes to examine the consumers welfare of an interior solution
one can detect a trade-o¤ in consumers welfare in terms of the quality of
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life e¤ect and the tax e¤ect. The income tax reduces the consumers welfare
directly by the consumption e¤ect but the subsidy on producers raises the
quality of life of consumers indirectly through its impact on pollination -
the externality e¤ect. Stated di¤erently, the consumers move down along
their indi¤erence curves on the (q; c) space. If in addition to that, the tax
policy moves them to a higher indi¤erence curve the policy increases the
welfare. Intuitively, the socially optimal second best tax and subsidy rates
are determined at the level where this movement ends. The greater is the
role of the quality of life e¤ect on the consumers welfare the more likely it is
that the consumers welfare increases. The subsidy enhances the producers
welfare through its positive income e¤ect and the risk bearing e¤ect but
reduces it through the declining price e¤ect. We have established
Proposition 1. There is a trade-o¤ in consumers welfare in terms of
the quality of life e¤ect and the tax e¤ect. The subsidy enhances the pro-
ducers welfare through its positive income e¤ect and the risk bearing e¤ect
but reduces it through the declining price e¤ect. The existence of a positive
externality on consumers can make the optimal subsidy on producers and the
optimal tax rates on consumers positive but depends on a number of mecha-
nisms. Ultimately, though the case remains an empirical one the greater is
the role of the quality of life e¤ect on the consumers welfare the more likely
it is that the consumers welfare increases. The e¤ect of the subsidy on the
producers welfare remains, at least in principle, ambiguous.
Though the outcome remains an empirical one Lemma 4 suggests that
for high-income countries at least, the costs of the tax and subsidy programs
can be reasonable.34 It is striking that the welfare also of those consumers is
enhanced by an income tax levied on them who do not consume honey. We
state
Corollary 1. The optimality of a positive tax rate does not depend on
whether the consumers consume honey or not.
As the consumers in our model are similar (apart from the Ãi¡parameter!)
and so are the producers we can rewite the above expressions in terms of a
representative consumer and a representative producer. In an interior opti-
mum, the condition determining the optimal tax rate turns out to be inde-
34Recall that the tax and subsidy program studied in our paper di¤ers from the US
price supporting program of the 1990s.
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pendent of the number of consumers, n, in the economy,
E
·
@ (buih + buio)
@t
+ ¹w
¡
eih + e
i
o
¢
+ ¹t
@w (eih + e
i
o)
@t
¸
= 0: (29)
To study a comparable result for the optimal subsidy rate, note rst that
the e¤ect of the tax rate on the subsidy program can be written as
@S
@s
= mk [1 + "(m; s) + "(k; s)]
where "(m; s) = (@m=@s) (m=s) is the elasticity of the number of pro-
ducers with respect to the subsidy rate and "(k; s) = (@k=@s) (k=s) is the
elasticity of investment with respect to the subsidy rate. Then
E
µ
@ (buih + buio)
@q
@q
@Y
@Y
@s
+
@ (buih + buio)
@p
@p
@s
¶
+
E
½³m
n
´· bvi
@s
¡ ¹k (1 + "(m; s) + "(k; s))
¸¾
= 0: (30)
The last term has both a positive and a negative component. If the
number of producers, m, is small or the number of consumers, n, consisting
both of those who consume honey and those who do not, is large35, the last
term is very small. In that case, the subsidy rate can be made large to make
the marginal welfare e¤ect of the quality of life, the marginal externality
small in conditions of the diminishing marginal utility. The greater is the
number of consumers in the economy relative to the number of producers the
easier it is thus to defend the argument of subsidizing the producers.36 Thus,
Corollory 2. The magnitude of the optimal subsidy rate is positively
related to the number of consumers relative to the number of producers in the
economy.
35Note that them¡variable cannot be moved to the front of the expected value operator.
36This view reminds us of the argument by Arrow and Lind (1970) who long ago sug-
gested that the total cost of risk bearing of an independent public project is made negligible
by the spreading of the risk over the entire population of taxpayers. Moreover, Mayshar
(1977) (who did not examine the externality) concluded that if the government is more
neutral toward risk than the private investor, then it ought to subsidize the private project
in order to further its level of investment.
38
From the above expression for s¤; it is also clear that as @Ebvi=@s > 0;
the optimal subsidy rate is increasing in the risk of the producers and their
risk aversion.
Corollary 3. The optimal subsidy rate is increasing in the risk of the
producers and their risk aversion.
The two instruments, though derived independently, are consistent with
each other once the government budget is balanced which requires that ¹ > 0:
These expressions show in which way the shadow price of public revenue, ¹;
restricts the extent to which the combination policy should be carried out.
6 Final remarks
This paper has introduced a research agenda in terms of optimal policies
in an industry where honeybees equipped with Calvinistic preferences do
the job. Such an industry generates fundamental external e¤ects on human
beings and the whole nature. The industry operates under substantial risks
and the losses may amount to more than 50 percent of its labor force, the
honeybee societies. Its output, honey, is a substitute for regular sugar for
the consumers. It has ingredients which the regular sugar does not have. It
consists of fructose (40 per cent), glugose (35 percent) and cane sugar (1 per
cent) in addition to the water (17 per cent). In addition to these, there are
vitamins and minerals like calcium and magnesium in honey not forgetting
some enzymes and amino acids. More important, the production of sugar
does not give rise to the positive pollination externalities associated with
honey.
We notice that the policy e¤ect studied in this paper is to increase the
consumption of honey. Is this welfare-increasing? People need carbohydrates.
They tend, however, to develop an addiction with respect to the consump-
tion of sweets which addiction apparently has evolutionary origins. Honey,
however, is healthier than the regular sugar. This means that an increased
consumption of honey reduces the consumption of the regular sugar to the
extent that they are substitutes. This is a welfare gain of its own! Even
when taxing the consumption of sugar can be defended as an instrument in
ghting against the excessive consumption of sweets the same argument does
not readily apply to honey.
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